University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1948

Validity under the Robinson-Patman Act of a
Uniform Delivered Price of One Seller
Walter B. Wooden

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Wooden, Walter B., "Validity under the Robinson-Patman Act of a Uniform Delivered Price of One Seller" (1948). Minnesota Law
Review. 2483.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2483

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

129'

VALIDITY UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT OF
A UNIFORM DELIVERED PRICE OF ONE SELLER
By WALTER B. WOODEN*

T

ARTICLE is an analysis of and a rejoinder to one which appeared in the Minnesota Law Review of May, 1947, under the
above title.' The author was Mr. Neil C. Head, member of the
New York bar.
The thesis of Mr. Head's article was that a uniform delivered
price of one seller is valid under the Robinson-Patman Act, and
that the, Federal Trade Commission's position thereon is legally
unsound in the opinion of most lawyers and the author (p. 599).2
However, it was also stated that the Federal Trade Commission
is engaged in a general campaign "against the pricing methods in
general use in American industry."
Thus what purported to be and for the most part was a strictly
legal argument by Mr. Head was colored at the outset by a subtle
suggestion that the Commission is hostile to the legitimate needs
and interests of industry at large and of single sellers. Such a suggestion implies that the Commission is acting without regard to
the purposes for which it was created and in disregard of its statutory powers as construed by the courts. The fact is that the
Commission can not successfully challenge any pricing method
until and unless it satisfies the reviewing Federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, that a given pricing method is within
the purview of statutes which forbid it because of its injurious
effect on competition. This the Commission must do on a case-bycase basis, giving each challenged party his day in court on that
ultimate issue. -No general orders can be entered by the Commission.
Orders to cease and desist from the use of any pricing method will
be sustained by the courts only if the Commission finds that the
method has an adverse effect on competition and only if that finding
is supported by sustantial evidence. Therefore, any statement that a
campaign is under way is no more than a statement that the Commission is seeking to eliminate pricing methods which to it appear
*Associate General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, Washington,

HIS

). C. The views here expressed at the invitation of the Minnesota Law Re-

view are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Federal Trade
Commission.

1. (1947) 31 Minn. L. Rev. 599.
2. Further references to Mr..Head's article will be to the appropriate
page in 31 Minn. L. Rev.
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to be injurious to competition, which is precisely what Congress
intended it to do. If it goes wrong in a particular case the courts
will provide the necessary relief under the statutory provisions for
court review. Presumably the success or failure of the so-called campaign will turn upon the ability of the Commission to satisfy the
courts that substantial evidence has been adduced in each case to
show injury to competition.
Against this strange silence concerning any relation between the
Commission's objective and the basic economic problem of monopolistic pricing methods, Mr. Head puts forward two of "the many
commercial advantages of a one-price policy." One of these is "the
power to name the price in national advertising and thus identify
the product with a moderate price" (p. 599). The idea savors of
resale price control of consumer goods based on consumer acceptance of an advertised price and has little if any relation to the
situations where the Commission has instituted proceedings against
sellers of heavy goods sold to processors or dealers without any
nationally advertised price. Mr. Head says this pricing method has
been adopted "particularly in consumer goods industries." The second commercial advantage named is "the avoidance of accounting
costs which in some cases may exceed the transportation costs."
On a priori grounds there is good reason to question the soundness
of this statement, especially in view of the further statement that
under this method "the seller pays the full freight" (p. 600). In
the first place there is a formidable amount of accounting cost
before such a delivered price can be built up. This involves an extensive study and an averaging of transportation costs such as will
insure against an over-all loss on shipments the costs of which
continually fluctuate. And if the seller does actually pay the freight
he must break down the delivered price which he has built up into
separate accounts with the carriers and the purchasers. That accounting costs may in some cases exceed the transportation costs
seems inherently improbable, except for deliveries where no transportation costs are involved as at the factory door. The idea that it
costs more for accounting than for transportation seems fantastic
for deliveries in the more distant parts of the United States. Or if it
does cost more such a pricing method would present a new point
of questionable vulnerability.
As a matter of fact, however, payment of freight by the seller
is not an essential element in such a delivered price. This Mr. Head
recognizes when he says that a 'seller may by "allowing full
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freight to destination, actually be quoting what is defined above
as a uniform delivered price" (p. 601). In any event, whatever
commercial advantage there may be to a seller in the advertising of
a single price across the country must of course be held subordinate to the interests of the public in preventing injury to competition. No seller need fear attack upon such a price unless substantial evidence can be adduced that it does or probably does injure
competition.
THE ALLEGED POSITION OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

In the same context Mr. Head's article states that "this campaign has progressed so far that the Commission is now attacking
the use by a single seller of a uniform delivered price to all customers wherever located-one price across the country" (p. 599).
He includes such a price among those which he later says are "all"
under attack (p. 600). These statements are incorrect. In no instance has the Commission instituted a proceeding against a single
seller attacking his use of a uniform delivered price to all customers
wherever located. And if it were to do so it could not avoid the
necessity of showing by substantial evidence that it injures or
would probably injure competition.
Apparently the statements last quoted rest upon the cases referred to by Mr. Head in his discussion of "Basis for the Commission's Position" (pp. 604-607). He says (p. 606) that the Chain
Institute complaint charges that "a uniform delivered price of a
single seller violates the Robinson-Patman Act," and quotes an
allegation from the complaint as to "each said respondent."' There
were 17 seller-respondents in that case. In that same paragraph of
the complaint from which the above quotation was taken it was
also alleged that there were involved in the delivered price system
of the several respondents "Matched delivered price quotations or
offers as made by all respondents to any gtyen customer, so that
such customer in considering or accepting any of such offers is
denied the opportunity ordinarily afforded under price competition
to bargain with one respondent member as against another." In
Paragraph 9 of that same Count II it is alleged that "each of the
said respondents" discriminates "for the purpose and with the
effect of enabling all the respondents to exactly match their delivered price offers." Paragraph 10 of that same Count II alleges
3. Docket No. 4878, as amended, Count II, Par. 6, filed 1942, amended
1945.
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that the inherent and necessary effect of the discriminations involved
is to eliminate price competition between the various respondent
members. So it hardly appears accurate to say, as .Mr. Head does,
that the Commission was there attacking the practice of a single
seller. Moreover, Paragraph 11 of Count I of the same complaint
charges the use by each respondent seller of a zone delivered price
system pursuant to a combination whose purpose and effect was to
suppress price competition among all respondent sellers.
Nor does the National Lead Company case 4 cited by Mr. Head
(p. 607) give any support for his claim that the Commission "is
now attacking the use by a single seller of a uniform delivered price
to all customers, whenever located-one price across the country"
(p. 599). Incidentally the price structure in that case did not involve "one price across the country" but a series of 12 zones or
areas with a different uniform delivered price in each zone. Mr.
Head treats the two as generically different types of structure
(p. 600), and there says that he is concerned only with the single
zone type. And at the outset he stated that his article "is devoted
to examining the validity under that Act, of such a one-price
policy" (p. 599). In the National Lead Case there are 6 corporate
sellers charged with unlawful price discrimination. Count II alleges
that each of them uses the zone delivered price method and practice,
that this results in matched delivered prices by all 6 sellers, and
that each uses the zones and thereby discriminates in price for the
purpose and with the effect of enabling them to match their delivered price quotations (Count II, Pars. 7, 8, 9, 12). Under Count
I these 6 seller-respondents were charged with maintaining a price
fixing combination of which their uniform zone delivered price
structure was alleged to be a part [Par. 7(2)]. So it would appear
that this second case relied upon to support the statement that the
Commission is attacking a single seller's uniform delivered price
does not support it.
Mr. Head cites a third instance of proceedings by the Commission which he says shows that "the position of the Commission
has continued unchanged" and which position he had characterized
as that of attacking the use by a single seller of a uniform delivered
price, "one price across the country." This third instance consists
of two complaints against two clay sewer pipe associations and
their members. 5 (p. 607). There are 18 corporate respondent-sellers
4. Docket No. 5253, filed 1944.
5. Matter of Clay Products Ass'n, Docket No. 5483; Matter of Clay
Sewer Pipe Ass'n, Docket No. 5484; both filed 1947.
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charged with price discrimination in one of these complaints and
20 in the other. The charges in both cases in that connection are
practically identical with those made in the Chain Institute case as
already described. Each of these two cases also includes a Count I
which alleges a price fixing combination of which uniform delivered
price zones are alleged to be a part. Incidentally, neither of these
sewer pipe cases involves a single zone with "one price across the
country" and which is the only kind of uniform delivered price
Mr. Head says "we are here concerned with" (p. 600).
It would appear that no case has been cited which suppoits
the statement that the Commission "is now attacking the use by a
single seller of a uniform delivered price to all customers, whereever located-one price across the country" (p. 599). The present
writer does not believe that any such case can be cited. This does
not mean, of course, that the Commission would have no power
to institute such a case if the adverse effect on competition could
be shown, for as Mr. Head says, the Robinson-Patman Act "is
directed at the practices of a single seller acting alone" (p. 604).
However, it does not follow that there can not be a combination
of sellers to discriminate in price as Mr. Head implies when he
says that the Act does not apply to discriminations accomplished
"inconcert with any other person" (p. 605). There could well be
combination or concert of action to violate any law and especially
any law which makes injury to competition its standard of illegality.
The fact is that practically all the cases brought by the Commission involving any form of discrimination in delivered prices
have been brought against a group of sellers who were each discriminating in order to match their delivered prices and thus
eliminate competition among themselves. Only in an exceptional
case where a single seller might have a monopolistic position would
there be any basis for action against him under the RobinsonPatman Act unless the effect of his discrimination is to injure or
prevent competition among his customers. Such effect was the
basis of decision by the Supreme Court upholding the Commission
against single sellers in the Glucose cases.6 But those cases did not
involve the use of zone delivered prices or of "one price across
the country" but were basing point cases the merits of which Mr.
Head does not discuss in this connection.
In view of the foregoing it is hardly accurate to say undiscriminatingly as Mr. Head does (p. 599) that "such a one-price
6. Corn Products Refining Co. v. F. T. C., (1945)
F. T. C. v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., (1945) 324 U. S. 746.

324 U. S. 726;
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policy is regarded by the Federal Trade Commission as 'discrimination' within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act." Such
language would readily be taken as meaning that the Commission
regards such a policy as unlawfully discriminatory under the
Act but no case can be cited to support the statement. The most
that could be said in support of the statement is that the present
writer and perhaps individual members of the Commission or of
its staff have advanced the view that delivered prices which make
other than due allowance for differences in cost of delivery result
in differences in the net factory price which are discriminatory,
but which are not unlawfully discriminatory unless they have the
injurious effect on competition specified in the statute. But that is
no more than the Supreme Court said in the Staley case, that
because the delivered prices there had "no relation to the actual
cost of delivery, they are systematic discriminations prohibited by
whenever they have the defined effect upon comSection 2(a)
' 7
petition.
DISCRIMINATION BY UNIFORm DELIVERED PRICES AND BY OTHER

FoRMs OF

DELIVERED

PRICES

It is only a verbal truism which enlightens no one to say that
a one-price policy cannot create discriminatory prices under the
statute, and naturally anyone might well be surprised that anyone
else could think otherwise. The obvious verbal inconsistency reflects
only the question-begging assumption that a single delivered price
across the country is a one-price policy. The soundness of that
assumption depends on the basic concept of the price of a commodity as distinguished from its transportation and on the meaning
of the statutory provision regarding the making of "only due
allowance" for differences in its cost of delivery. Theoretically it
may be discriminatory "to have equality among unequals" as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter said in his dissenting opinion in the regional
freight rate discrimination case decided May 12, 19 4 7s but Section
2(a) of the Clayton Act of course does not prevent equality at
the seller's option to purchasers among whom discrimination might
be warranted. So. Mr. Head's "one price across the country"
cannot be successfully attacked unless upon analysis it is found
to be a cover for discriminations in net factory prices which have
the injurious effect on competition required by the statute. Only in
the event that such injurious effect can be shown would it be neces7. Id. at 750, 751.

8. New York v. U. S., (1947) 57 Sup. Ct. 1207, 1247.
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sary to determine whether a uniform delivered price can be discriminatory. However, since such injurious effect may appear in
later cases, it might be well to re-examine the assumption that the
system of "one price across the country" has been correctly labeled.
Under the title "Pricing Methods in Common Use" Mr. Head
describes five methods, four of which he says are under attack by
the Commission. He includes among the five the "one price across
the country" method used by a single seller which, as has been
shown above, has not been attacked by the Commission. It is stated
that "the only method of pricing which the Commission says is
not open to attack under the Robinson-Patman Act" is that where
"the seller quotes a uniform price f.o.b. mill" (p. 600). That
statement requires a most important qualification; namely, that no
delivered price which makes only due allowance for differences in
cost of delivery is open to such attack. The inference is clear that
the four types of delivered prices that are then said to be under
attack fail to make such allowance. And to whatever extent they
are under attack the attack cannot succeed unless injury to competition can be shown as well as the existence of price discrimination.
Delivered prices that are not discriminatory are as much beyond
attack as prices f.o.b. mill that are discriminatory are open to
attack. Otherwise, one would have to assume that all delivered
prices are necessarily discriminatory and that all f.o.b. mill prices
are necessarily non-discriminatory.
Mr. Head states that "what is in form a delivered price quotation may be used in an f.o.b. mill pricing method, if the seller is
quoting to each customer varying delivered prices, each made up
of a uniform f.o.b. price plus actual freight to destination" (p. 601).
He thereby recognizes that there can be delivered prices which
are not discriminatory because they make only due allowance for
differenes in cost of delivery. There is no more warrant for saying
that such prices are delivered prices in form but not in substance
than for saying the same of delivered prices which do not make
such allowance. If the uniform net mill price is the substance of
the transaction in the one case, then the varying net mill price is
the substance in the other.
Mr. Head describes four classes of delivered pricing, (1) a
"uniform delivered price" defined as quoting "the same price at
all destinations to all buyers," (2) "freight equalization," (3)
"zone delivered prices," and (4) "f.o.b. basing point other than
point of shipment." However, he treats these four classes as though
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each were the pricing method used by a single seller rather than a
method used by all sellers in a given industry (pp.600, 601).
Obviously the use of a given pricing method by which all competitors discriminate in price in order to match their delivered prices
stands on quite a different legal footing than its use by a single
seller. And every one of the four classes of delivered prices described is susceptible of being used for that purpose, including what
Mr. Head calls a "uniform delivered price." For example, "one
price across the country" was involved in the pricing of tire chains
in the Chain Institute case" cited by Mr. Head but it was not the
act of a single seller.
Moreover, in addition to the availability of all four classes of
delivered prices for the common purpose of matching the delivered
prices of all competitors who use them, and in addition to their
common element of variation in mill net which Mr. Head recognizes, one may doubt the validity of the separation into four group
classifications. Thus one may doubt that there is any difference
in principle or substance between "one price across the country"
considered as one zone and one price across a large section of the
country considered as two or more zones under the title "zone
delivered prices." The same doubt arises as to the validity of the
differentiation between the "freight equalization" method which
involves discrimination only through "freight absorption" and
"f.o.b. a basing point other than point of shipment" which involves
discrimination through both "freight absorption" and "phantom
freight."
Mr. Head is incorrect in stating (p. 600) that it was the
"freight equalization" method that was attacked in the Cement
case. It was the basing point method involving both "freight absorption" and "phantom freight" that was attacked in the Cement case' 0
and it is quite gratifying to note his concurrence in the writer's
view that "this method was condemned in the Corn Products case"
(p. 601). It was the "freight equalization" method that was attacked
in the Milk Can case."
As a matter of fact, the term "freight equalization" could
logically be applied to all four classes of delivered prices when
used by competitors with differing freights. It is also a more
9. Docket No. 4878, filed 1942, amended 1945.
10. Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. F. T. C., (C.C.A. 7th 1946) 157
F.2d 533, cert. granted (1947) 57 S. Ct. 967; submitted on oral argument
October, 1947, 16 U. S. L. Week 3131 (October 28, 1947).
11. Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute v. F. T. C., (C.C.A. 7th 1946)
152 F.2d 478.
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revealing term, for since actual freights can not be equalized except
by action of the carriers it means the equalization of freight advantages and disadvantages through systematic adjustment of their
net factory prices by the respective sellers. Such adjustments
are the negation of making only due allowance for differences in
cost of delivery.
In any event not only the Commission but the courts have condemned three of the four classes of delivered prices described by
1 3
12
Mr. Head-"freight equalization" and "zone delivered prices' as price fixing devices constituting unfair methods of competition
under the Federal Trade Commission Act, and "f.o.b. a basing
point other than point of shipment" as a price fixing device 4 and
also as unlawful price discrimination" under the Robinson-Patman
Act.
Under the sub-head "Development of the Campaign against
Delivered Prices," Mr. Head correctly emphasizes the importance
of differentiating between use of the term "uniform delivered
price" to designate "the same delivered price by several sellers at a
single point" and to designate "the price policy of a single seller"
(p. 601). As already shown, however, he failed to make that
important differentiation when he cited the Chain Institute, National Lead and the Sewer Pipe cases as instances where the Commission had attacked the use of the method by a single seller,'0
It is stated that the Commission "views with suspicion any uniformity of delivered prices of several sellers, and has regarded
such uniformity as strong evidence of the existence of conspiracy
or agreement" (p. 602). That is hardly an accurate statement unless there be added to it the element of substantial differences in
the costs of delivery from widely scattered sellers. And in all
cases where the Commission has proceeded there were other elements which substantially reinforced the inference of agreement
aris'ng from the identity of delivered prices.
Mr. Head quotes from the Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in
the Milk Can case to the effect that it was "an unnatural situation"
for purchasers in St. Paul to be able to buy at the same delivered
price from a Chicago seller as from a ,St. Paul seller, and then
12. Ibid.
13. Fort Howard Paper Co. v. F. T. C., (C.C.A. 7th 1946) 156 F.2d
899; American Chain and Cable Co. v. F. T. C., (C.C.A. 4th 1944) 139
F.2d 622; Salt Producers Ass'n v. F. T. C., (C.C.A. 3d 1943) 134 F.2d 354.
14. U. S. Malsters Ass'n v. F. T. C., (C.C.A. 7th 1945) 152 F.2d 161.
15. Corn Products Refining Co. v. F. T. C., (1945) 324 U. S. 726;
F. T. C. v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., (1945) 324 U. S. 746.
16. Supra pp. 131-33.
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comments that this "completely overlooks the elementary fact"
that otherwise the Chicago seller could not sell in St. Paul. (Footnote p. 602). But Mr. Head's criticism overlooks the elementary
fact that this situation involves an unnatural refusal by both
the Chicago and the St. Paul seller, as well as sellers located elsewhere, to give their local buyers any better price than the sellers
at distant places would give them. That it is unnatural for local
sellers with a natural advantage over sellers at a distance to disdain utilizing such advantage to gain local business was held by
the Circuit Court of Appeals in FortHoward PaperCo. v. Federal
Trade Commission.1 The argument that the Chicago seller must be

allowed to sell in St. Paul on an equality with the St. Paul seller
is in effect an argument that the handicap of distance- should be
cancelled for all sellers everywhere.
Referring to the Cement case Mr. Head states that the Commission endeavored "to get away from having to prove agreement
by contending that the use by a number of sellers of the same price
formula was inherently collusive and illegal, even in the absence of
agreement" (p. 603). That is a collection of contradictions. Of course
one does not and can not get away from proving agreement by contending that the formula is collusive and to speak of collusion where
there is absence of agreement does not make sense. Whether a given
situation is "inherently" collusive is nothing but the familiar concept
of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, which is ordinarily the
only available evidence by which collusion or agreement in such situations can be established. The quotation from the Circuit Court of
Appeals presented by Mr. Head in this connection embodies a similar
confusion of ideas. After the Court quoted from the Commission's
brief to the effect that "it makes no difference in the results"
whether base prices are the product of collusive agreement and
that it is the formula method of pricing "that produces the identity
of delivered price quotations," the Court says "this is a significant
statement and apparently means that it is immaterial whether the
identity of delivered price quotations resulted from the conspiracy
charged or from independent action"' 8 (p. 603, italics added).
Since the conspiracy charged was one to use the formula method
and not an agreement on the base prices to be used in that formula
the Court's conclusion was manifestly faulty. No such contention
was made in the Cement case which the Court says our quoted
statement "apparently means." We did contend that the basing
17. (C.C.A. 7th 1946) 156 F.2d 899, 906.
18. 157 F.2d 562.
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point formula there used was inherently collusive but that is a far
cry from contending that it was "immaterial" whether identity of
delivered price quotations resulted from collusion or from independent action. The theory of the Cement case as defined by the pleadings, findings and order made any such contention unnecessary and
irrelevant.
Under a sub-heading entitled "The Attack on the Delivered
Price of a Single Seller" (p. 603), Mr. Head states that the Commission "turned to the Robinson-Patman Act to implement its
campaign against uniform delivered prices by a number of sellers"
in order to avoid the necessity of proving agreement among sellers.
He says also that the Commission contends that to avoid discrimination under that Act "all sales must in effect be made at one price
f.o.b. mill, with all delivery costs charged to the buyer" (p. 603).
He states that "in theory the Commission would concede" the
legality of a delivered price which "includes, fully and exactly, the
costs of delivery to that buyer, no more and no less." Why this
should be referred to as a theoretical concession is not apparent.
So far as the writer knows, no one has ever suggested otherwise.
Nor is it apparent why the quoted statement should be contrasted
with the statement that "nevertheless it does unequivocally take
the position that to avoid discrimination the selling should be upon
a basis that results in the same net realization at the mill on all
sales-regardless of point of delivery." This is followed by the
statement that "of course, this is in substance the same thing as
selling at one price f.o.b. mill" (p. 603, 604).
It is true that in the Staley and Corn ProductsRefining Company cases the Commission took the position that the discrimination
there found was embodied in the varying net factory prices after
deduction of the costs of delivery. This interpretation of the
Act was apparently accepted by the Supreme Court in those two
cases. In the Corn Products case the Supreme Court held that
the basing point system there used "results inevitably in systematic
price discriminations, since the prices they receive upon deliveries
from Kansas City bear relation to factors other than actual costs of
production or delivery" (324 U.S. 732), and that the prices on
shipments from Kansas City to various cities "are frequently
discriminatory, since the prices in such cities usually vary according to factors, phantom freight and freight absorption, which are
unrelated to any proper element of actual cost," (id. at 739). The
Court set out in its opinion a table showing "this sharply varying
factory net and also the amounts of phantom freight" (id. at 733).
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In the Staley case failure to make due allowance is even more
clearly condemned. The Court said that "price discriminations are
necessarily involved where the price basing point is distant from the
point of production," that "this is because" of phantom freight or
freight absorption, and that "since such freight differentials bear
no relation to the actual cost of delivery, they are systematic discriminations prohibited by Section 2(a), whenever they have
the defined effect upon competition" (id. at 751). The Court said
also that in both cases the system discriminated systematically in
favor of some buyers and against others "by reason of respondents'
absorption of freight and collection of phantom freight" (id. at 756).
It would be difficult to select language more nearly approximating the proposition that failure to make due allowance for
differences in costs of delivery makes delivered prices discriminatory, for that was the only form of discrimination in the basing
point system used by the Corn Products and Staley Companies.
Yet Mr. Head characterizes this interpretation as "startling
and far reaching" (p. 604). How startling and far reaching such
an interpretation may be depends, of course, on the extent that
there may be delivered price systems which are discriminatory and
which are also injurious to competition. While such interpretation
involves a uniform net factory price subject to the statutory exemptions, it is not the same thing as "selling at one price f.o.b. mill,"
for it leaves open to the seller delivered prices which make due
allowance for differences in cost of delivery. The critics of such
interpretation are necessarily in the position of demanding and
defending either varying net factory prices or delivered prices
which do not make due allowance for differences in cost of delivery.
There is no logical escape from the conclusion that in either case
the demand is for and the defense is of discrimination.
Mr. Head follows his characterization of "startling and far
reaching" by asserting that "each mill, to the extent of its capacity,
would be given a monopoly in the area in which it had a freight
advantage, and no other mill could invade its territory" (p. 604).
This assertion carries the assumption that freight advantage is
the sole determinant of competitive advantage and the other
elements of competitive advantage can not or should not be
recognized. Obviously any method of pricing that makes freight
advantage the sole determinant, and then nullifies that advantage,
has automatically nullified all the other competitive elements
also. And unless it be defined in terms of a standardized form
of freight even freight advantage would not exclude one mill
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from another's home territory, to the extent one mill uses a cheaper
form of transportation than another. Any exclusion which might
occur would result from freight or other competitive advantage
being translated into a lower price than the distant mill would
care to meet, instead of cross hauling into each other's territory
at identical delivered prices. The phrase in the assertion under
discussion "to the extent of its capacity" is interesting and significant. For it recognizes that there is no economic explanation or
justification for distant mills regularly going into the home territory
of other mills on a freight absorption basis when the latter are not
operating to capacity.
The above quoted assertion was followed immediately by
another to the effect that "the country would eventually be split
into little Balkan industrial states" (p. 604). A similar assertion
was made in a brief filed by Mr. Head's firm on behalf of the
General Electric Company in a case now pending on review of the
Commission's order in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit 19 (Case No. 8644). This neat political figure of
speech has only one defect; it is an admission that the industries
to which it may be applicable are not composed of the autonomous,
independent units which competitive theory assumes them to
be but are cartelized industries which should not be disturbed.
Mr. Head proceeds to quote from the Circuit Court of Appeals'
opinion in the Cement case, which he says "summed up the Commission's objective" as being to give effect to the naturally inherent
advantages and disadvantages of mill location by making freight
advantages and disadvantages "supreme," with the result that
"the advantage and disadvantage would no longer be natural but
artificial, effected by the requirement that each mill sell on an
f.o.b. mill price"20 (p. 604). As already shown the Commission
does not propose any such requirement. Under the pricing system
involved in the Cenwit case, freight advantage and disadvantage
was considered by the industry as the sole and therefore the
"supreme" competitive factor, and as a factor that must be systematically offset through phantom freight and freight absorption.
Nor is it quite clear how what is a natural advantage to begin with
is transformed into an artificial one merely because the government intervenes to make the natural advantage effective.
Under the title "Basis for the Commission's Position" Mr.
19. Rigid Steel Conduit Ass'n v. F. T. C., Case No. 8644, C. C. A. 7th,
reviewing (1944) 38 F. T. C. 534.
20. 157 F.2d 563.
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Head states that "a delivered price which is the same to all buyers
would not seem to involve any discrimination of any kind" but
that the Commission nevertheless "takes the position that a uniform
delivered price does constitute a discrimination within the meaning
of the Act, since the net realized at the mill is greater on some
sales than on others" (p. 605). As previously shown, no case
involving only a single seller's use of such a price can be cited. Mr.
Head also cites in this connection Rigid Steel Conduit Association
et al. v. FederalTrade Commission,21 now on appeal to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. He cites it in support of his statement
that "apparently" the Commission "believes that such a pricing
system of an individual seller also constitutes an unfair method
of competition" under the F. T. C. Act (p. 605). No question
of the use of a uniform delivered price is involved in this case nor
is the use of any pricing practice by a single seller. It is a basing
point case which Mr. Head had previously distinguished from
the uniform delivered price (p. 601) and it involves all the producers of conduit, not a single seller, as Mr. Head's own footnote
recognizes (p. 605).
It is true that the Commission has regarded mill net as the
true price in delivered prices that include delivery by common
carrier and has taken the position that discrimination in such
prices is ascertainable only by comparison of the mill nets. Otherwise all differences in delivered prices would be prima facie discriminatory. Instead of quoting from the complaint in the Cement
case to the above effect it would have been more appropriate to
have quoted from the Commission's findings to that effect. However,
as already indicated, the Supreme Court in the Staley and Corn
Productscases found the discrimination in terms of mill net and that
this resulted from failure to make due allowance for differences
in cost of delivery.In the Cement case the Commission found that
even though the word "price" in the Act were taken to mean
delivered price and not mill net, the delivered prices of cement were
discriminatory because they did not make the due allowance required
by the statute.
MEANING OF "PRICE" AND

"DUE

ALLOWANCE"

Mr. Head takes issue with the concept that "the seller must
make allowance for the exact cost of delivery, neither more nor
less" (p. 606) and under "Proper Interpretation of the Act" presents his theory of what is price and what is due allowance (p. 607).
21. (1944) 38 F. T. C. 534.
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Arguing that price means delivered price he states that "the purchaser's interest in a price is the cost to him at the place he will
use the commodity" and that "his ability to compete, which the
Act seeks to preserve, depends on the cost to him at that point"
(pp. 607, 608). The argument attempts to prove too much. Price
as used in the Act surely does not mean delivered price only, for
if so, discrimination in f.o.b. mill prices would not be prohibited
at all. While a purchaser's interest in price may be in what it costs
him at the place of use he may not necessarily be interested in
its cost delivered by common carrier; he may wish to provide
his own transportation to the place of use for reasons of economy,
convenience or to get a lower delivered cost than his competitor.
What is place of use depends on whether the commodity is to be
consumed, processed or resold without processing. The "ability"
of purchasers to compete, which Mr. Head says the Act seeks to
preserve, has little or no application to consuming purchasers and
yet it would hardly be contended that consumers have no protection against discrimination. The ability of processor and dealer
purchasers to compete may depend on their ability to reduce their
delivered costs by providing their own delivery facilities from the
factory to where they want to use it. Moreover, a dealer may want
to use the commodity for resale at a place where he has no established place of business. The law permits this as one of the rights
of free competitive enterprise, although organized dealers have
opposed it and obtained support from organized maunfacturers
for its inhibition. There is no doubt that delivered price systems
lend themselves readily to such an inhibition. A question also
arises whether the ability of purchasers to compete is necessarily
synonymous with inability of some to purchase more cheaply than
others where lower costs of delivery would warrant it, as in "one
price across the country."
One difficulty with this line of argument about the ability of
purchasers to compete is that it assumes the statute has no applicability to the preservation of competition among the producers
and sellers of a commodity. The terms of the Act very definitely
include the preservation of that kind of ability to compete, but that
is ignored in the remainder of Mr. Head's argument on this point.
He returns to the argument that price means delivered price, stating
that if the seller chooses to quote a delivered price, "that would
seem to be the price in which discrimination is forbidden," and
that "it is difficult to spell out from the text a requirement that
the freight paid by the seller be deducted to ascertain the
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price in which discrimination is forbidden" (p. 608). Of course no
one would suggest that discrimination in delivered prices is not
forbidden, but it is impossible to determine whether such discrimination exists when delivered prices differ, and if so the
amount of discrimination, except by a comparison of mill nets.
Otherwise every difference in delivered prices would be discriminatory. Mr. Head also argues that the proviso regarding due allowance "is meaningless" if the word price means mill net, "since
a mill net never includes transportation cost" (p. 608). This is
a non-sequitur because the proviso would hardly be meaningless
just because it applies only where delivery is furnished and mill
net would include transportation cost if furnished in the seller's
owned vehicle.
Where delivered prices do not differ as in "one price across
the country," the crucial question, as Mr. Head recognizes, is
whether the statute requires due allowance for differences in cost
of delivery or merely permits it. Quoting the proviso of the Act that
it shall not prevent "differentials which make only due allowance
for differences in the costs of manufacture, sales or delivery,"
he states that "this proviso presupposes differentials in price which
are due to inclusion of cost of delivery" and that "the word
'only' in the phrase 'only due allowance' connotes a maximum; its
use is inconsistent with interpreting the proviso as a requirement."
(p.608). The first statement quoted can mean only that differentials which are not due to inclusion of cost of delivery are not
the differentials which the proviso "presupposes." Nevertheless,
the argument is that some differentials other than those the
proviso "presupposes" are permissible and they are to be considered permissible if they do not exceed a "maximum." To reach
that conclusion the word "only" is treated as meaning the same
as "no more than." Webster's Dictionary, however, defines the
word as "no or nothing more or no other than; for no other
purpose; at no other time, in no other wise, etc. than; exclusively;
solely; merely." So the word "only" as used in the proviso excludes every allowance for differences in cost of delivery except
those which are "due." Webster's defines "due" as "owed or
owing as a natural or moral. right; becoming, fit, or appropriate;
rightful, proper or just." Thus both the word only and the word due
unite in excluding allowances that are not made on account of
differences in cost of delivery and in excluding the idea of a
maximum.
Moreover, one who entertains the idea of a maximum must
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define that maximum, and apparently the only logical definition
is that any differential in delivered prices must not exceed the
difference in cost of delivery. Mr. Head having conceded that the
price differential can not exceed the difference in cost of delivery,
let us examine the validity of the idea that the price differential
can be less than the difference in delivery cost. Let us assume a
case where the difference in cost of delivery is 50 cents per unit
of product and where the allowance or price differential is only
25 cents. According to Mr. Head that should be permissible
because it is less than the difference in cost of delivery. The
result, however, is to increase the price by 25 cents to the purchaser at one location above the price to the purchaser at the
other location and to increase the mill net by that amount. The
actual freight being less by that amount than the imputed freight,
the 25 cents is socalled phantom freight. So the idea that it is
permissible to make allowance for less than the difference in cost of
delivery becomes a rationalization of phantom freight, the most
implausible and indefensible aspect of delivered prices which do
not make due allowance for differences in cost of delivery. On the
other hand and by the same token it follows that when Mr. Head
concedes that price differentials cannot exceed differences in cost
of delivery he has conceded that the proviso cannot justify freight
absorption. For example, he concedes that the proviso will not
permit the difference in cost of delivery to be 25 cents per unit and
the allowance or price differential to be 50 cents. In any event all
these permutations attach themselves to and are reflected in the
net factory prices, and the higher of two prices, or the maximum,
is no more immune than the lower from a charge of discrimination.
Mr. Head pursues this argument by contending that if one
interprets the proviso as requiring due or exact allowance for
differences in cost of delivery, "it would necessarily follow that
the seller must, in every sale, make due, that is, exact, allowance
for differences not only in cost of delivery but also in cost of
manufacture and sale."'It will be noted that Mr. Head here adopts
the normal meaning of the word "due," only to recoil from its implications. He correctly says that "even the Commission has not
advanced this interpretation" (p. 608). However, this conveys
the impression that the reason for not advancing it is because it
is patently unsound, whereas the sufficient explanation is that the
Commission has had no occasion to pass on the issue in any formal
way. But let a case be assumed where every ingredient of unlawful
discrimination exists unless the seller affirmatively proves due
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allowance for differences in cost of manufacture or sale under the
proviso, then it would seem that the law has put on him the requirement of making due allowance by requiring him to prove that
he has made it.
CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY
Under the title "Congressional History," Mr. Head discusses
the striking of the proposed definition of price as mill net from the
Robinson-Patman Act while it was being debated in Congress
and says the Commission "is now asking the courts to require
sellers to use the f.o.b mill pricing method" which is "exactly
what Congress refused to do" (pp. 608, 609). The Commission
is not asking the courts to do any such thing. It is doing exactly
what Mr. Head's own quotation (p. 609) from the Supreme
Court's opinion in the Corn Products case shows that Congress
intended, namely, that Congress "left the legality of such systems
to be determined accordingly as they might be within the reach of
Sec. 2(a), as enacted, and its more restricted prohibitions of
discriminations in delivered prices. '22 Whatever it was that the
Commission required in the Staley and Corn Products cases the
Supreme Court upheld it, but it is no more correct to say that the
Commission is asking the courts to require use of the f.o.b. mill
pricing method in the cases now pending than to say the same of the
two former cases. Only deliyered prices that are discriminatory
can be reached under the Robinson-Patman Act, and discriminatory
f.o.b. mill prices also can be reached thereunder.
In this connection Mr. Head quotes from the opinion of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the Cenent case, to the effect
that Congress had "over the years steadfastly refused to declare
illegal" the pricing system there involved and if it "is now to be
outlawed by the courts, it will mark the high tide in judicial
usurpation" 23 (p. 609). In the first place Congress did not steadfastly refuse to declare the basing point system illegal, and the
Supreme Court rejected the contention that Congress intended to
legalize it. The Cement case was grounded upon charges and
findings of a price fixing conspiracy, a thing which both Congress
and the courts have long condemned under both the Sherman Act
and the Federal Trade Commission Act. If the court had confined
itself to a holding that the Commission did not have substantial
evidence to support such findings, it would have been on theoreti22. 324 U. S. 737.
23. 157 F.2d 573.
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cally unassailable ground however one might disagree with its
conclusion concerning the evidence.
COURT DECISIONS
Under the title "Court Decisions," Mr. Head next proceeds
to discuss the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Staley and
Corn Products cases and the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in the Cement case. For some reason he failed to discuss
them in connection with his preceding titles, "The Attack on the
Delivered Price of a Single Seller" and "Basis for the Commission's
Position" pp. 603, 604), although the Staley and Corn Products
cases were very pertinent to those titles. The three cases referred to
are used under "Court Decisions" as support for the thesis that the
uniform delivered price is not discriminatory under the RobinsonPatman Act. None of the cases is in point, for no such system was
involved; and Mr. Head accurately describes as "dictum" the
following sentence in the Staley opinion, which, he says, "upheld a
uniform delivered price (p. 610):
"But it does not follow that respondents may never absorb
freight when their factory price plus actual freight is higher than
their competitors' price, or that sellers, by so doing, may not maintain a uniform delivered price at all2 points of delivery, for in that
event there is no discrimination." 4
However that may be, it is also clear, from its use of the words
"by so doing," that the Court conceived of such a price as one involving only freight absorption and as excluding phantom freight.
The fact of the matter is that it is impossible to have a uniform
or zone delivered price that meets such a specification. For in all
localities where the imputed freight factor is more than the actual
freight as in localities at or near the factory, there will be phantom
freight. Freight absorption can occur only in the localities where
the imputed freight factor is less than the actual freight. Some
form of freight average must be used in a uniform or zone delivered
price system, and it is almost necessarily an average of freight
costs based on previous sales rather than an average of the freight
rates. In either case, the buyers who fall below the average must
pay more freight than the actual and those who are above the
average are permitted to pay less than the actual. This runs counter
to the Supreme Court's declaration that a non-discriminatory
system is one which gives to purchasers who have the natural
advantage of proximity to a seller's plant "the price advantages
24. 324 U. S. 757.
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which they are entitled to expect over purchasers at a distance." 25
Curiously enough, Mr. Head here treats the Staley and Corn
Products cases as condemnatory of phantom freight only, while
at p. 601 he had concurred in the present writer's judgment that
both phantom freight and freight absorption were condemned.
Nevertheless he quotes from the Commission's brief in the Cement
case expressing such judgment and points out that the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals had disagreed with it (p. 611). By contrast
with the omission of freight absorption and the stressing of
phantom freight in his discussion of the Staley and Corn Products
cases, Mr. Head here omits phantom freight and stresses freight
absorption in his discussion of the Cement case. He does this in
apparent repetition of his error (p. 600) that the Cement case
involved freight absorption only, whereas about half the cement
mills were non-base mills and systematically charged phantom
freight as part of the pricing formula. Presumably the Supreme
Court will clarify this disputed point concerning the status of
freight absorption under the Staley and Corn Products cases when
it decides the Cement Case.2 1 Mr. Head is also in error when he
states that the delivered price of cement varied at different destinations "according to the freight rate from the nearest mill" (p. 612).
It varied only according to variations in the all-rail freight translated
into barrel rates from the governing basing point which was not
always the nearest mill and not always a point of production.
One can not wholly agree with Mr. Head's statement that a
reversal by the Supreme Court of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in the Cement case "would not be conclusive as to the validity of the uniform delivered price by a single seller." Nor can
one altogether disagree with his statment that if freight absorption
is condemned by the Supreme Court in the Cement case, this
"would not be a holding that a uniform delivered price constituted
a discrimination" (p. 612). If the Court should more clearly agree
with the Commission concerning thestatus of net factory price as
the true price, and that systematic freight absorption has no better
legal status than phantom freight, the vulnerability under the
Robinson-Patman Act of a uniform delivered price which injures
27
competition would become apparent.
25. Ibid.
26. Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. F. T. C., (C.C.A. 7th 1946) 157
F.2d 533, cert. granted (1947) 57 S. Ct. 967; submitted on oral argument
October, 1947, 16 U. S. L. Week 3131 (October 28, 1947).
27. Incidentally the case of Fort Howard Paper Co., et al. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 156 F.2d 899, would have been as relevant, if not more so,
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CONCLUSION

In his "Summary and Conclusion" Mr. Head recognizes that
the word price "must in some cases" mean other than delivered
price (p. 612). This he had omitted to recognize at p. 608. He
repeats the fallacy that delivery costs "can never be part of a mill
net." All he means is that delivery cost through common carrier
can never be part of the mill net. By recognizing that price may
mean either mill net or delivered, Mr. Head must also recognize
that either one may be a discriminatory price. If a delivered price
is discriminatory it is because it fails to make due allowance for
difference in cost of delivery. If a delivered price is discriminatory
it must manifest itself in the mill net and if a mill net price is
discriminatory it must manifest itself in the delivered price. Discrimination can not be concealed or canceled merely by turning the
one form of price quotation into the other.
Mr. Head states (p. 612) that to treat the words "only due
allowance" in the proviso of Section 2(a) as requiring "exact
allowance for differences in cost of transportation" is to require
"disregard of the plain meaning of the word used." But at p. 608
he had himself treated the word "due" as meaning "exact."
He also there treated the word "only" as meaning "no more than,"
for which there is no dictionary warrant. The inference from these
various contentions is that the proviso should be applied only to
differentials which "make no more than exact allowance" for differences in cost of delivery or of manufacture or sale. And who can
say what that would mean?
Mr. Head draws the final conclusion that "the Commission's
position is legally untenable seems inescapable" (p. 613). Assuming that the position referred to is the alleged one of attacking the
uniform delivered price of a single seller if has been shown that
the Commission has not initiated any such attack in a formal case
and until it does the question is academic. If and when such a
formal case is brought, it will be necessary for the Commission to
establish by evidence which the courts will regard as substantial
that there is discrimination which has a reasonable probability of
preventing or injuring competition. Under the law the Commission
can do no more; under the public policy declared by the law it can
do no less.
to Mr. Head's analysis of the cases as his use (p. 605, m. 17) of Rigid Steel
Conduit Ass'n, et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 19, which has
not been decided.

